話說自羅馬皇帝君士坦丁遷都拜占庭以降,希臘教會的聲望和財富都
這些宗教寶物讓羅馬教會相當嫉妒與自卑。也因此,十字軍攻破君士
中世紀的歐洲基督徒對自己與基督教的歷史現場(locus)的遠
1783
*630 Thursday, 22d May, 1783. Where the captain of a slaveship mistook Hispaniola for Jamaica, whereby the voyage being retarded, and the water falling short, several of the slaves died for want of water, and others were thrown overboard, it was held that these facts did not support a statement in the declaration, that by the perils of the seas, and contrary winds and currents, the ship was retarded in her voyage, and by reason thereof so much of the water on board was spent, that some of the negroes died for want of sustenance, and others were thrown overboard for the preservation of the rest.
This was an action on a policy of insurance, to recover the value of certain slaves thrown overboard for want of water. The declaration stated, that by the perils of the seas, and contrary currents and other misfortunes, the ship was rendered foul and leaky, and was retarded in her voyage; and, by reason thereof, so much of the water on board the said ship, for her said voyage, was spent on board the said ship: that before her arrival at Jamaica, to wit, on, &c. a sufficient quantity of water did not remain on board the said ship for preserving the lives of the master and mariners belonging to the said ship, and of the negro slaves on board, for the residue of the said voyage; by reason whereof, during the said voyage, and before the arrival of the said ship at Jamaica—to wit, on, &c. and on divers days between that day and the arrival of the said ship at Jamaica—sixty negroes died for want of water for sustenance; and forty others, for want of water for sustenance, and through thirst and frenzy thereby occasioned, threw themselves into the sea and were drowned; and the master and mariners, for the preservation of their own lives, and the lives of the rest of the negroes, which for want of water they could not otherwise preserve, were obliged to throw overboard 150 other negroes. The facts, at the trial, appeared to be, that the ship on board of which the negroes who were the subject of this policy were, on her voyage from the coast of Guinea to Jamaica, by mistake got to leeward of that island, by mistaking it for Hispaniola, which induced the captain to bear away to leeward of it, and brought the vessel to one day's water before the mistake was discovered, when they were a month's voyage from the island, against winds and currents, in consequence of which the negroes were thrown [233] overboard. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, a rule for a new trial was obtained on the grounds that a sufficient necessity did not exist for throwing the negroes overboard, and also that the loss was not within the terms of the policy.
Davenport, Pigott, and Heywood, in support of the rule.—There appeared in evidence no sufficient necessity to justify the captain and crew in throwing the negroes overboard. The last necessity only could authorize such a measure; and it appears, that at the time when the first slaves were thrown overboard, there were three butts of good water, and two and a half of sour water, on board. At this time, therefore, there was only an apprehended necessity, which was not sufficient. Soon afterwards the rains came on, which furnished water for eleven days, notwithstanding which more of the negroes were thrown overboard. At all events the loss arose not from the perils of the seas, but from the negligence or ignorance of the captain, for which the owners, and not the insurers, are liable. The ship sailed from Africa without sufficient water, for the casks were found to be less than was supposed. She passed Tobago without touching, though she might have made that and other islands. The declaration states, that by perils of the seas, and contrary currents and other misfortunes, the ship was rendered foul and leaky, and was retarded in her voyage; but no evidence was given that the perils of the seas reduced them to this necessity. The truth was, that finding they should have a bad market for their slaves, they took these means of transferring the loss from the owners to the underwriters. Many instances have occurred of slaves dying for want of provisions, but no attempt was ever made to bring such a loss within the policy. There is no instance in which the mortality of slaves falls upon the underwriters, except in the cases of perils of the seas and of enemies.
Lee, S.-G., and Chambre, contra. — It has been decided, whether wisely or unwisely is not now the question, that a portion of our fellow-creatures may become *631 the subject of property. This, therefore, was a throwing overboard of goods, and of part to save the residue. The question is, first, whether any necessity existed for that act. The voyage was eighteen weeks instead of six, and that in consequence of contrary winds and calms. It was impossible to regain the island of Jamaica in less than three weeks; but it is said that [234] other islands might have been reached. This is said from the maps, and is contradicted by the evidence. It is also said that a supply of water might have been obtained at Tobago; but at that place there was sufficient for the voyage to Jamaica if the subsequent mistake had not occurred. With regard to that mistake, it appeared that the currents were stronger than usual. The apprehension of necessity under which the first negroes were thrown overboard was justified by the result. The crew themselves suffered so severely, that seven out of seventeen died after their arrival at Jamaica. There was no evidence, as stated on the other side, of any negroes being thrown overboard after the rains. Nor was it the fact that the slaves were destroyed in order to throw the loss on the underwriters. Forty or fifty of the negroes were suffered to die, and thirty were lying dead when the vessel arrived at Jamaica. But another ground has been taken, and it is said that this is not a loss within the policy. It is stated in the declaration that the ship was retarded by perils of the seas, and contrary winds and currents, and other misfortunes, &c. whereby the negroes died for want of sustenance, &c. Every particular circumstance of this averment need not be proved. In an indictment for murder it is not necessary to prove each particular circumstance. Here it sufficiently appears that the loss was primarily caused by the perils of the seas.
Lord Mansfield.—This is a very uncommon case, and deserves a reconsideration. There is great weight in the objection, that the evidence does not support the statement of the loss made in the declaration. There is no evidence of the ship being foul and leaky, and that certainly was not the cause of the delay. There is weight, also, in the circumstance of the throwing overboard of the negroes after the rain (if the fact be so), for which, upon the evidence, there appears to have been no necessity. There should, on the ground of reconsideration only, be a new trial, on the payment of costs.
Willes, Justice, of the same opinion.
Buller, Justice.—The cause of the delay, as proved, is not the same as that stated in the declaration. The argument drawn from the law respecting indictments for murder does not apply. There the substance of the indictment is proved, though the instrument with which the crime was effected be different from that laid. It would be dangerous [235] to suffer the plaintiff to recover on a peril not stated in the declaration, because it would not appear on the record not to have been within the policy, and the defendant would have no remedy. Suppose the law clear, that a loss happening by the negligence of the captain does not discharge the underwriters, yet upon this declaration the defendant could not raise that point.
Rule absolute on payment of costs 2 .
Douglas
1. S. C., but without the arguments of counsel. Park Ins. 82, 6th ed.
2. It was probably this case which led to the passing of the statutes 30 G. 3, c. 33, s. 8, and 34 G. 3, c. 80, s. 10, prohibiting the insurance of slaves against any loss or damage except the perils of the seas, piracy, insurrection, capture, barratry, and destruction by fire; and providing that no loss or damage shall be recoverable on account of the mortality of slaves by natural death or ill-treatment, or against loss by throwing overboard on any account whatsoever. See Tatham v.Hodgson , B. R., E. 36 G. 3, 6 T. R. 656. As to insurance upon animals which have been killed by the perils of the seas, seeLawrence v. Aberdein , B. R., M. 2 G. 4, 5 B. & A. 107; Gabay v. Lloyd , B. R., H. 5 & 6 G. 4, 3 B. & C. 793.
這段小史或可以幫助讀者透過法學教育的發展來洞察法律學這門 "學術" 的本質 --- 一門組合實務技藝以及純學術分析的學問。稱其為學術,非常可能使人誤把她與哲學、史學等純粹的學術等而視之。但這個簡化及類比的迷思,正是我想要透過下文來顛仆而破的。
西羅馬帝國覆滅之後,羅馬司法體制便在西歐停止運作。直到十二世紀開始,義大利的波隆那以及法國的巴黎地區出現許多講師復興了羅馬法的研究,同時也開始整理、發展通用於整個西方基督教世界 (Chrisendom) 的教會法;這是現代西方法學教育的濫觴。
在英格蘭,牛津和劍橋相繼成立大學,羅馬法以及教會法所構成的法學是這兩所中古大學的核心學術之一。這兩組法律的共通性是其普世適用性,也就是這兩組法律在整個西方基督教世界都是有效的。無疑地,各地區的統治者基於其個別的治理需求,會制定適用於其領土的地方法 (municipal law),地方法當然有其區域侷限性;適用於英格蘭的地方法當然不同於適用於法蘭西的。與此同時,羅馬法及教會法所構成的 "普通法" (ius commune) 則以法律通則、法理、及法學方法的性質通用於各地區,輔助地方法的使用。
因此,這裡便可用是否具有普世通用性作為標準來將法律作區隔:有地域性的地方法,以及普世性的羅馬法與教會法。
這個區別相當重要。因為英格蘭的中古大學,也就是牛津和劍橋,以此為標準,將不具普世性的英格蘭地方法,也就是一開始提到的慣例法,排除於大學法學教育之外。換句話說,牛津和劍橋不認為慣例法是大學教育的關懷。
縱使大學不教,慣例法的營運還是需要人才。最早開始系統性地訓練慣例法專才的機構是今天位於倫敦市中心的律師學院:Inns of Court。在這個機構裏,經驗豐富的實務家對年輕法曹解說判例,並且注重訓練機智、靈巧的訴訟技藝。嚴謹的學術方法與深思不是法律教育的關懷。
很明顯地,法律教育是實務訓練,而非學術訓練。學術是大學的王國,你去大學裏可以學習數學、科學、文學、史學、哲學、神學、以及法理學等等。在經過學術洗禮之後,你才到律師學院接受實務訓練,學習議會制定的法規、重要的法院判決、辯論及演說術、法庭程序及禮儀等等。事實上,以 1850 到 1950 這一百年為例,大多最傑出的英國律師皆非出身大學法律系。
"法學" (The academic study of law) 在大學裏正式地建立是十九世紀末的事情,受益於 Dicey (維多利亞時代的英國憲法巨擘) 和 Maitland (英格蘭現代法律史學方法的奠基者) 的貢獻。但實務訓練集中於律師學院的這個分工傳統迄今沒有改變。 (順道一提,Maitland 在劍橋的席位稱為 Downing Professor of the Laws of England, 當初取這個名稱的目的我想應該就是要強調這個教席的設置目的在於英格蘭地方法的講授,不同於以往的羅馬法和教會法吧。)
據此,比起大學裏其他的學術"前輩",現代法學的任務相當不同。法條以及法院判解這類素材的學習有濃厚的務實取向 --- 訓練運用既有規範解決實際問題的能力。相較之下,傳統學術則是探索自然及人類活動的多樣現象,發掘解析隱而未現的諸般規律。政治學、社會學、人類學、經濟學、哲學都在從事這類的學術任務。
這類學術任務向來不是傳統法律教育的主要關懷。然而,法律教育既升格而成為大學裏的 "法學" 了,便逐漸將學術關懷納入法學的議程之中。(哈佛法學院的發展史說明了這個轉型,茲不贅言。) 法學開始進行法條以及法院判解的分析,探索這些法律規範的來由。亦即,如同其他的人類活動,法律規範之下也有諸般隱而未現的規律,法學作為一門學術便是要發掘解析它們。
傳統的側重實務的法律教育並沒有這類學術經驗;法律學者需要借助其他學門的學術工具來進行其工作。故而,為因應這個發展,當然愈來愈多人會認為法律人該學習經濟學、社會學、政治學... 等等。
不過,沒有改變的是法律教育的起點以及核心仍舊是務實取向的,它們不是純粹的學術,也不會變成學術。法律學的漫長發展將實務技藝與學術探索組合起來,但觀察者應當避免誤會這是法律學從技藝往學術的演變,而以為學術方法正在並將會穿透整個法律學。務實取向這個傳統任務以及學術分析這個現代發展出自兩個截然不同的關懷,觀察者應該避免簡化及混淆這個法律學本身的多樣性。期待這篇小史能幫助讀者釐清這個誤解。
至於應不應該加強實務法律人的學術洞察力,這就是如何有效率地利用有限資源(三到四年的法律教育)的問題,並非本文欲解決的議題。
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參考書目:
J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History
M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe
A. T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer
R. Helmholz, Canon law and the Law of England
上議院,the House of Lords,簡稱 the Lords,是一個既古老又年輕的機構。古老是指它的源起、名稱、與外觀;年輕是指它現行的組成與功能。
今天的上議院與往昔的那個上議院幾乎是完全不同的機構。當然,今天的美國參議院也一定和1787年的參議院差很多。但上議院的轉變類型已大到改變它作為雙院制議會中第二院的性質。往昔的上議院是一個不復存的時代的古跡。在那段不復返的歲月裡,英國的社會階級分明。王室、世襲貴族、與教會是社會的特權階級;平民則由 上帝之手賦予他們服從與服務的使命。以這個社會結構為基礎,上議院代表的是特權階級的權利。相對地,平民的權利則由仕紳在下議院來代表。在那個時代,人們相信世襲貴族與教會的特權乃 上帝賦予,天經地義。因此,教會領袖與世襲貴族列席上議院並守護其權利乃事所必至,理所當然。
那個時代已成為古裝劇的題材。但上議院卻意外地長壽,走入了信仰人生而平等的新時代。舊時代的結束表示上議院的舊功能已無關緊要,上議院若不被廢除,則必須轉型為現代憲政國家的雙院制議會中的第二院(Second Chamber)。美國與法國的參議院都是現代第二院的範例。
上議院的轉型並不完全。上議院一方面開始進行審查甚至否決下議院法案的工作;另一方面卻沒有革新上議員(Peer)的遴選方法。一直到1958年的非世襲議員法(The Life Peerage Act 1958)通過以前,上議院的成員,除了依專業任命的上議院法官(Law Lords)之外,仍舊無異於以往:世襲貴族(hereditary peers)以及國教(Church of England)的大主教與主教。
非民選而且充斥世襲貴族的上議院明顯欠缺民主正當性;這個民主赤字嚴重削弱了上議院作為一個正常第二院的功能。上議院在二十世紀初期覺悟這個道理。1909年時,左傾的自由民主黨執政,但保守黨占絕對優勢的上議院否決了自民黨所主導的下議院通過的預算案(這個有點複雜,算是一個包裹法案,非純預算)。這個上議院自認正當的作為激起了輿論的強烈不滿,因為上議院的民主正當性虛弱,加之保守黨佔絕對多數,使許多人認為上議院根本沒有資格對抗下議院通過的法案。
這個衝撞觸發了1911年的議會法(The Parliament Act 1911)的通過生效。該法廢止了上議院對下議院預算案的否決權(veto)。至於非預算案,上議院雖也不得否決,但可以延遲該法案取得王室許可(Royal Assent)而生效的期間(此權稱之為 suspensory veto)。這個延遲期間在1949年被進一步修法縮短。上議院至今唯一有權否決的事項是下議院推遲大選期限(五年)的法案。這個否決權的作用在於阻止當任的下議院在沒有取得上議院的同意前就可延長自己的在位期間;這可說是一種權力制衡的憲政設置。
上議院同時也很識趣地認識到自己的處境,發展了自我節制的政策。最具代表性的當屬稱作莎立布里慣例的憲政慣例(Salisbury convention,這個名稱是來自提出這個構想的上議員的領地。該區域村落可人,風景如畫,很多留學生會去那邊尋幽訪勝。)。此慣例內容大略是,下議院所通過的法案內容,倘若屬於該下議院多數黨在大選時所提出之政見的一部分,則上議院不與置喙。雖然其詳細的作法沒有表面說來如此單純。總體而言,這種節制態度可以從數字上覺察:從1911年到2009年為止,上議院總共僅延遲了下議院的法案七次。
上議院進一步的轉型賦予上議院新生命。首先,世襲貴族群其實產生了一批專業與飽學的上議員。接著,前述的非世襲貴族法引入不可世襲的終生上議員身分,許多各領域的專家透過這個管道被政府舉薦進入上議院。第三,1999年布萊爾的工黨政府通過上議院法(The House of Lords Act 1999),將世襲貴族去蕪存菁,從原本過千人的冗大團體裁減至92人,同時也大幅消彌了保守黨在上議院不成比例的多數優勢。這一連串對上議院組成的改革使上議員成功轉型為一個效能卓著的法案審查機構(intra-parliamentary pre-legislative scrutiny)。幾乎所有公允的論者都承認目前上議院審查法案與思辯的水準遠高於下議院,原因正來自於它目前非民選而專才取向的組成。一句話很逗趣地捕捉上議院的成敗:上議院的弱點是非民選;優點也是非民選。
目前就功能上,上議院的傑出表現是無爭的。但無法克服的難題又在於上議院的定位是立法機構,而許多人似乎堅認立法機構不可欠缺民主正當性。雖然很多大權在握的公部門也沒有民主正當性,但唯獨立法機構讓許多人感到特別抓狂。因此,解決上議院尷尬處境的方法只有兩種:改民選,或廢止。
改民選可預見會帶來許多缺點,除了該採用何種代表原則在非聯邦制的英國很難決定之外,民選的上議院很可能只是下議院的複製品。職業政客而非領域專家將充任議員,上議院目前的優點勢必無法存留。此外,雙軌民意存在於議會也很可能衝擊內閣制的穩定性。例如,若上議院改選後的多數黨恰好是目前下議院的在野黨,這樣首相要不要率領內閣總辭?日本就已經發生這種情況。這種結局即便是最激進的改革者也不會樂見。
因此,大多數的論者便表示,若真要變革,則廢止上議院,並另外成立一個獨立的法案審查機構承攬原先上議院的任務,組成也沿襲上議院的專業取向。這個變革幾乎不影響現行立法思辯的水準,唯一的差別在於這個機構名義上不屬議會的。而這個名義上的區別正是許多人念茲在茲的。
然而,縱然廢止上議院並另成立審查委員會的作法在理論上最無爭,上議院這個存續數百年的機構當真該就此闊別世人嗎?上議院難道沒有其他存在意義?上議院見證英國不成文憲法的百年演變;雍容的上議院是女王君臨議會舉行議會開幕大典不可或缺的人文風景;頭戴假髮、身披長袍、侍立於女王跟前威儀凜凜的世襲貴族們幾乎是海內外所有人對英國政治最直觀的想像之一。上議院更深刻的存在意義或許便在此:讓英國人眼見英國憲政制度的歷史性與獨特性,進而產生對國家的自豪與敬愛。這是十九世紀英國著名法學家白志浩(W. Bagehot)筆下的 "威嚴憲法"(dignified constitution)。威嚴憲法與功能憲法(efficient constitution)相輔相成,前者帶來愛國情操與憲法忠誠,後者確保憲政運作的效能,一同組成英國的不成文憲法。已故而備受敬重的上議院法官賓漢(Lord Bingham of Cornhill)曾提醒讀者,上議院正是我們英國憲法中威嚴部分的核心之一。
藉由上面的敘述我們可以從英國經驗思考至少兩件事。第一就是所謂的實用主義。上議院最初的型態在進入二十世紀後是徹底過時的。但英國人沒有輕言廢除,反而透過轉型賦予上議院新功能與新生命。正是如此實用主義的態度,讓英國許多的憲政機構都具有上百年的淵源,但行使的是與時俱進的新功能。這種作風與我第二件想提的事情相關,是憲法的威嚴。正因為這樣執意保守制度延續性的態度,才讓英國的憲政制度充滿歷史感。這個歷史感會對觀察者帶來一種無關理性的感動 -- 這種感動或許與現場目睹吉薩大金字塔以及羅馬萬神殿的感動系出同源;是一種出自美學的感動。有這種感動,才有威嚴憲法可言。
我們都會欣羨英國或美國的憲法威嚴無比。但這份威嚴是來自一代一代的人竭心盡力地守護制度,將舊法條與舊制度賦予新意義以成就崇高偉業。當眾人不斷目睹憲法成功克服萬難而英雄式地實踐其宣揚的價值,憲法的威嚴才會累積。這份對制度的珍惜與執著,是值得對制度欠缺信任感的臺灣人放在心上的。